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In the stories told by opinion makers and many law professors, 
American constitutional law is concerned with two things—individual 
rights and the powers of government—and it is settled by the Court, 
which was established by Article III of our national Constitution.  In 
those now-familiar tales, the United States Supreme Court creates 
constitutional law when heroic individuals assert their fundamental 
rights against an overreaching state and when Congress, state legisla-
tures, and executive agencies are called upon to justify their expert 
enactments to an overreaching judiciary.  To settle these constitu-
tional disputes the Court looks either to the text of the written Con-
stitution or to a Living Constitution, which looks something like the 
textual Constitution plus Justice Kennedy’s morning prandial con-
sumption. 
These stories are so familiar to us that we know the case names 
from memory—on the side of individual rights, Dred Scott v. Sandford,1 
Brown v. Board of Education,2 Miranda v. Arizona,3 Roe v. Wade,4 Law-
rence v. Texas;5 and those concerning (limits on) the powers of gov-
ernment to promote the public good, McCulloch v. Maryland,6 Lochner 
v. New York,7 Wickard v. Fillburn,8 United States v. Morrison,9 National Fed-
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 1 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 2 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 4 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 5 559 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 6 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 7 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 8 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 9 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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eration of Independent Business v. Sebelius.10  Like Bunker Hill, Gettys-
burg, Omaha Beach, and Gulf of Tonkin, these names are written in 
our nation’s history in bold print, designating the places where our 
national identity was forged and our ideals were vindicated, or not. 
But these stories are not entirely accurate.  For one thing, much 
of what we know as constitutional law is settled by institutions other 
than the Supreme Court and derives from sources other than the 
written Constitution.  For example, the Supreme Court recognizes as 
fundamental rights those rights that are deeply rooted in the history, 
legal traditions, practices, and conscience of the American people.11  
Those traditions and that conscience are generally expressed in fed-
eral and state statutes, other state and local laws, customs, the ethical 
codes of professional associations, and the laws of other institutions 
outside the national government.  Those institutions settle and specify 
the contours of the rights and duties.12  The Supreme Court of the 
United States merely describes what has already taken place. 
So, even if we were to accept that constitutional law is concerned 
only with individual rights and government powers, we must look to 
legislation, state law, common law, and private law to find the founda-
tions and the raw materials of constitutional law.  Public law is built 
upon the foundation laid by the common law using materials con-
structed not only by legislatures but also by institutions of private or-
dering. 
It is strange that the primacy of private law and common law has 
been so long neglected.  As James Stoner has observed, many terms 
and concepts in our written Constitution are defined by common law 
doctrines.13  Understanding those terms and doctrines requires us to 
understand how juries, private institutions, legislatures, judges, and 
other common law institutions of rulemaking have defined them and 
continue to shape their meaning. 
Furthermore, the written Constitution does not answer every 
question.  The Framers gave us a Constitution that leaves much of the 
definition of rights, wrongs, duties, and obligations to private law and 
state common law.  As Justice Alito argued in his dissent in Snyder v. 
Phelps, it is a mistake to read the Constitution to secure individuals’ 
 
 10 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 11 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, 720–21 (1997). 
 12 See generally GRÉGOIRE C.N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE 
LIMITATION OF RIGHTS (2009). 
 13 JAMES R. STONER, COMMON-LAW LIBERTY:  RETHINKING AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
(2003); James R. Stoner, Why You Can’t Understand the Constitution Without the Common Law, 
LIBRARY OF LAW AND LIBERTY (Dec. 2, 2012), available at http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-
forum/why-you-cant-understand-the-constitution-without-the-common-law/. 
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rights to perform actions that private lawmakers have judged wrong-
ful and about which the text of the Constitution is silent.14  So, for ex-
ample, a jury, the common law repository of practical wisdom, which 
is charged with resolving private-law disputes, has judged that to 
“launch[] a malevolent verbal attack” upon the family of a dead Ma-
rine at that Marine’s funeral constitutes intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, a wrong which tort law condemns.15  Given that judg-
ment and the Constitution’s own silence on what constitutes 
protected speech, why should the Court extend to the thugs who 
launch such an attack a First Amendment “right to brutalize”16 the 
family with words? 
In reality, the law that governs our various constitutional orders—
state, federal, and non-governmental—is much more expansive than 
our constitutional texts and the judicial opinions interpreting them. 
Much of the law that governs our constitutional orders never finds its 
way to the United States Supreme Court, never implicates the text of 
the Constitution, and does not involve the relationship between the 
individual and the state.  The prevailing narrative’s dichotomy be-
tween individuals and state actors, and its near-obsession with the 
power of our Supreme Court, blinds us to hidden actors who are do-
ing much of the work in creating and preserving ordered liberty. 
These hidden actors in our constitutional orders are groups, asso-
ciations, and private and civic communities, which determine the 
rights and duties of their members, and shape the rights of their 
neighbors, as they order their affairs in pursuit of a common good.  It 
is easy to overlook the role of those institutions and groups in consti-
tuting ordered liberty because they perform their work quietly, out-
side the national spotlight.  They do not deliberate on C-Span.  The 
products of their deliberations are not published in bound volumes 
for law students to study.  Instead, they create law and order privately, 
around kitchen tables, at congregational and associational meetings, 
and in boardrooms. 
Why does this matter?  Overlooking the role of private law makers 
in our constitutional orders is like coming into a movie when it is al-
ready half over.  You might pick up some aspects of the plot.  You 
might even figure out who the good guys and bad guys are supposed 
to be, and what genre of predicament they find themselves in.  But 
you won’t know how they got there:  what cultures, institutions, cir-
cumstances, and moral agents led them to this momentous juncture.  
 
 14 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
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Indeed, there might be important characters and subplots that you 
know nothing about.  Therefore, you might not appreciate the com-
plexity of the situation at hand. 
Where can we look to find these hidden law makers at work? Oc-
casionally they show up in Supreme Court decisions.  Associations, 
civic institutions, and other makers of private and civic order require 
constitutional protections against unlawful incursions, just as individ-
uals do.  So, many of the important cases in American Constitutional 
Law, the most foundationally important to ordered liberty perhaps, 
are those that protect or jeopardize the authority and autonomy of 
private and civic institutions to settle and specify the rights and duties 
of their communities’ members.  Alas, these cases tend to be less well-
known than those mentioned above—Dartmouth College v. Woodward,17 
Prince v. Massachusetts,18 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,19 Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale,20 Healy v. James.21 
But we need not turn to Supreme Court decisions to see the pri-
macy of private ordering in our constitutional orders.  Its priority is 
evident from the text of the Constitution itself.  This is not the place 
to point out all of the terms and provisions of the Constitution which 
presuppose, preserve, and incorporate by reference the law created 
within domains of ordering other than the national government.  
This essay will confine itself to two such domains:  (1) domains of re-
ligious freedom and (2) domains of private property ownership. 
A growing number of scholars—notably Mary Ann Glendon and 
Richard Garnett—are calling attention to the communal and institu-
tional nature of religious exercise.22  If the freedom secured by the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment is cast as a matter of individ-
ual rights and state power exclusively, then the contest over religious 
freedom becomes a contest between individual interests and state in-
terests.  The wall of separation between public and private leaves reli-
 
 17 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 18 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 19 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 20 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 21 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 22 See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 
501 (1991) (describing Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion in Walz v. Tax Commission, 
397 U.S. 664 (1970), as a rare instance in which the Court has acknowledged that the 
Free Exercise Clause has “associational, institutional, as well as individual, dimensions”); 
Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?  Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Reli-
gion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 274 (2008) (“The freedom of religion is not only lived 
and experienced through institutions, it is also protected and nourished by them.”); Mat-
thew J. Franck, Individual, Community, and State:  How to Think About Religious Freedom, 41 
IMPRIMIS 1, 1í4 (Sept. 2012) (discussing the role of institutions in defending religious 
freedoms). 
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gious actors to appeal to one branch of government—the courts—for 
freedom from incursions by the other branches of government.  Put 
differently, the rights and duties of religious actors are, on the pre-
vailing view, determined by state actors.  The only question is which 
branch of the government will specify the rights and duties that pro-
tect religious freedom. 
This binary conception of religious freedom is reflected in our 
current free exercise law, which treats religious freedom as a matter 
of striking the correct balance between the public good and the in-
terests of religious individuals who are burdened by general laws.  For 
the last two decades, since the Court’s landmark decision in Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,23 Con-
gress and the Supreme Court have battled over the question of 
whether the interests of governments or of religious individuals 
should weigh more heavily.  But both Congress and the Court share 
the contestable premise that religious individuals and state actors are 
the only stakeholders in the matter. 
Against the binary view, Mary Ann Glendon has argued for a more 
historically-based understanding of religious freedom, which she calls 
“structural free exercise.”  Viewing “the institutional and association-
al, as well as the individual, aspects of religious freedom,” she has 
said, makes us aware “of the role of America’s religions in the cultural 
foundations” of our constitutional order.24  The history of religious 
exercise from before the time of our founding suggests that “individ-
ual free exercise cannot be treated in isolation from the need of reli-
gious associations and their members for a protected sphere within 
which they can provide for the definition, development, and trans-
mission of their own beliefs and practices.”25 
The Supreme Court recently vindicated this protected sphere in 
part in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.26  The Court unanimously ruled, 
over the protests of many law professors and the New York Times, 
that federal non-discrimination law does not reach the decisions of 
religious organizations to hire and fire their religious leaders.27  The 
 
 23 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 24 Glendon & Yanes, supra note 22, at 537. 
 25 Id. at 544. 
 26 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).  See also Richard W. Garnett & John M. Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor, 
Religious Freedom, and the Constitutional Structure, 2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307, 309 (2012) 
(noting that Hosanna-Tabor “provides a crucial starting point and touchstone” for under-
standing the scope of this sphere). 
 27 See, e.g., Editorial, The Ministerial Exception, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, at A22 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/opinion/the-ministerial-exception.html?
ref=us&version=meter+at+5&region=FixedCenter&pgtype=Article&priority=true&module
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Court thus preserved a space within which religious organizations are 
free to constitute themselves, free of the interference of public law 
and political actors.  But this space is small, an exception to the gen-
eral rule that the boundaries of religious freedom are specified by the 
government or by individual initiative. 
The sphere of religious freedom, which Garnett has called “a so-
cial space within which persons are formed and educated”28 resem-
bles another, more expansive domain of freedom which also predates 
our Constitution, namely private property.  Our private property 
norms and institutions were not created by the United States Consti-
tution but rather were transmitted to us by the common law that the 
American colonies inherited from Great Britain.  In the common law 
tradition, property is created, and property rights are specified, by 
families, civic institutions, and local communities before those rights 
are delimited and curtailed by exercises of government powers.  Pri-
marily, property rights are specified within families as they deliberate 
and choose how to use, manage, and distribute the resources availa-
ble to them, and how to acquire more resources.  Also, property 
rights are specified by neighbors, religious assemblies, businesses, ju-
ries, and other associations and institutions of private and civic order-
ing.  As they resolve the question of what should be done with the re-
sources available to them, these groups specify property rights and 
duties.  Unless unreasonable, their judgments are binding upon the 
deliberations of judicial actors.29 
The U.S. Constitution acknowledges the pre-constitutional defini-
tion and establishment of property rights in several places. 
x Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 gives Congress the power “To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”30  This 
provision is known as the Intellectual Property Clause, 
which authorizes copyright and patent protections.  The 
 
=RegiWall-Regi&action=click (noting that Hosanna-Tabor’s “sweeping deference to 
churches does not serve them or society wisely”); Adam Liptak, Religious Groups Given ‘Ex-
ception’ to Work Bias Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2012, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/12/us/supreme-court-recognizes-religious-exception-
to-job-discrimination-laws.html (noting objections of Professor Douglas Laycock). 
 28 Richard W. Garnett, Mary Ann Glendon and the Structure of Religious Freedom, PUBLIC 
DISCOURSE (July 23, 2013), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/07/10506/. 
 29 See generally Adam J. MacLeod, PROPERTY AND PRACTICAL REASON (forthcoming 2014) 
(discussing the role of institutions of private ordering in specifying the norms of proper-
ty—the duties, rights, and limitations on rights that guide and bind the practical delibera-
tions of those who encounter owned things). 
 30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
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“exclusive right” which it references is the full set of rights 
that attaches to property ownership at common law. 
x Article I, Section 10 prohibits states from passing laws im-
pairing the obligation of contracts.31  This clause presup-
poses that citizens have the freedom to exchange their 
property and to make promises of exchange, and the Con-
stitution insists that the states must not interfere in this 
important domain of private ordering. 
x The Third Amendment protects the sanctity of the family 
home by giving homeowners an absolute veto over the 
quartering of soldiers within a house in times of peace.32  
The special protections afforded to the family home at 
common law, which are recognized and preserved in the 
United States Constitution, provide a significant ground 
for the right that has in recent decades come to be known 
as the general right to privacy. 
x The Fourth Amendment recognizes the pre-existing right 
of the people, shaped and protected by the common law 
prohibitions against trespass, “to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects.”33 
x The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit state ac-
tors from depriving any person of property without due 
process of law.34  In an unbroken chain of precedents, the 
Supreme Court has stated that “property” here means 
what state law says it means.35  And in the absence of con-
trary legislation, the states define property with reference 
to its common law dimensions.36  In other words, the Fifth 
Amendment accepts the dimensions of property that are 
 
 31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obliga-
tion of Contracts.”). 
 32 U.S. CONST. amend. III. (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner.”). 
 33 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 34 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 35 Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (“Because the Consti-
tution protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest 
is determined by reference to ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an inde-
pendent source such as state law.’”) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) 
(applying Pennsylvania law to establish property interest in land estate). 
 36 Phillips, 524 U.S. at 165 (“The [property] rule that ‘interest follows principal’. . . has be-
come firmly embedded in the common law of the various States.”); Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–31 (1992) (arguing any taking authorized by 
statute or decree must effectively be supported by state common law, such that the courts 
would come to the same conclusion absent the statute or decree); Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164, 178–79 (1979) (referring to common law authority to analyze owner-
ship interest in a dredged marina). 
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established by institutions of private and civic ordering 
within common law institutions. 
x The same is true of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, which provides, “nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”37  In 
the case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Su-
preme Court ruled that this clause impedes states from al-
tering by regulation those rights which property owners 
enjoy at common law.38  If a state wishes to regulate away 
the property rights which the owner enjoys under com-
mon law then the state must compensate the owner for 
the loss. 
The important role of private ordering within constitutional or-
dering was on display in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.39  In that 
case, the Supreme Court affirmed the authority of the University of 
California at Hastings to exclude from its law school campus a chap-
ter of the Christian Legal Society.  Some friends of religious liberty 
have worried that the Supreme Court in the Martinez case created a 
new right for state universities to exclude Christians.40  But the new 
law in Martinez was not made by the Supreme Court.  Rather, it was 
made by the policies of the two groups who opposed each other in 
the case—the University of California at Hastings and the Hastings 
Law chapter of the Christian Legal Society.  One of those policies was 
grounded in the ancient rights of private property.  The other was 
grounded in a particular expression of our first freedom of religious 
exercise.  The Court took a laissez-faire posture toward the conflict 
between these policies, allowing the University to exercise the domin-
ion of its property ownership to shape the rights and duties of its con-
stituents.41  The University’s decision then became constitutional law. 
The policy of Christian Legal Society is to require its officers to be, 
and therefore to act like, Christians.  In particular, officers of CLS 
 
 37 U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 38 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–31 (1992). 
 39 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 40 See, e.g., Hadley Arkes, Vast Dangers—Confirmed, FIRST THINGS (June 29, 2010) (“The way 
has been prepared now to push Christian groups off the ‘better’ campuses in this coun-
try, private or public . . . .”), http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2010/06/vast-
dangers-confirmed; Robert Shibley, The Fallout from Christian Legal Society, NATIONAL 
REVIEW ONLINE (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/290199/fallout-
ichristian-legal-societyi-robert-shibley (“Groups like the Christian Legal Society . . . could 
be required to . . . admit ‘all comers,’ or else face ‘derecognition’ . . . .  To lack recogni-
tion is basically not to exist at all on today’s college campus.”).  Arguably, the decision was 
novel in one respect, that the Court merged Christian Legal Society’s associational free-
dom argument into its free speech argument.  But, for better or worse, the Court found 
ample precedent for this elision of associational rights.  Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984–86. 
 41 See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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must agree to conform their conduct to Christian teaching on a 
number of ethical matters, including sexuality and marriage.42  U.C. 
Hastings’ policy is a bit more difficult to pin down.  As written and 
applied to CLS, the policy prevents a registered student organization 
from requiring its leaders to share the organization’s convictions on 
religion or sexual conduct.43  Hastings’ policy thus singles out reli-
gious groups for unfavorable treatment.  This written policy is sup-
posed to track California state law, which prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of, among other criteria, religion and sexual orientation.44 
During litigation before the Supreme Court, U.C. Hastings insist-
ed that it interprets the policy to apply to all student organizations, 
not just religious groups, and that this interpretation of the policy re-
quires “all student organizations to accept all comers.”45  Registered 
student groups must “allow any student to participate, become a 
member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless 
of her status or beliefs.”46  So, for example, the California University 
Democrats must allow to stand for the office of club president a stu-
dent who is a registered Republican and must permit all of that stu-
dent’s fellow Republicans to join the group.  A majority of the Su-
preme Court treated this all-comers policy as authoritative and 
refused to consider the policy as it was written and applied;that is, to 
single out religious organizations and to exclude CLS.47 
Hastings’ interpretation of the policy as a so-called “all-comers” 
requirement is problematic in itself.  An all-comers policy makes it 
difficult for student organizations to constitute themselves around 
ideas, especially normative truth claims.  Students would form a 
group called the California University Democrats because they be-
lieve that the commitments and proposals of the Democratic Party 
are true, valuable, and normative.  If the California University Demo-
crats must allow a student to serve as their president who rejects the 
commitments of the Democratic Party, and who is actively engaged in 
defeating the proposals of the Democratic Party, then their Demo-
cratic identity is in jeopardy.  Similarly, if the Christian Legal Society 
must accept as president a student who rejects Christian teaching and 
is actively engaged in persuading others to do the same, there is little 
 
 42 See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2980. 
 43 Id. at 2979–80. 
 44 Id. at 3016 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 66270 (West Supp. 2010) (Alito, J., dissent-
ing)). 
 45 Id. at 2993. 
 46 Id. at 2979. 
 47 Id. at 2984. 
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sense to the Christian Legal Society constituting itself as a Christian 
group. 
Put differently, U.C. Hastings’ policy elevates the individual at the 
expense of the group.  In fact, it empowers individual students to lev-
erage groups in their own, individual acts of self-constitution.  It gives 
any individual student the right to destroy any student group’s identi-
ty from within.  The Republican has a right to implement his Repub-
lican agenda by making nonsense of the California University Demo-
crats’ group identity; the atheist has the right to implement his 
agenda by making nonsense of the Christian Legal Society’s group 
identity.  The policy enshrines the idea—the normative idea—that a 
student must have the right to constitute his identity by destroying 
the identity of the group if he so chooses. 
Notice the irony here.  U.C. Hastings is a group.  It is a large 
group, but it is a group, which constitutes itself by committing to ide-
as, many of which are normative.  U.C. Hastings has constituted itself 
as a group in part by adopting policies, which individual members of 
the group must obey.  One of those policies is that groups may not 
constitute themselves by adopting policies when those policies con-
flict with the commitments of potential members, but must accept 
those potential members.  To enforce its policy, U.C. Hastings has re-
jected a potential member of its community—the Christian Legal So-
ciety—whose commitments conflict with its policy.  In short, U.C. 
Hastings has constituted itself as a group by committing itself to the 
norm that its member groups must be open to being thwarted in 
their efforts to constitute themselves as groups by committing them-
selves to norms. 
This evidently did not puzzle Justice Ginsburg.  Writing for the 
majority, Ginsburg argued that the Constitution allows U.C. Hastings 
to adopt any reasonable policy.48  And, she insisted, its policy is rea-
sonable.49  She explained, “Hastings’ policy, which incorporates—in 
fact, subsumes—state-law proscriptions on discrimination, conveys 
the Law School’s decision ‘to decline to subsidize with public monies 
and benefits conduct of which the people of California disap-
prove.’”50  That conduct, of course, is forming a group with other 
Christians.51 
 
 48 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984–88 (2010) (arguing that limited-public-forum decisions, 
under which speech limitations must be reasaonable and viewpoint neutral, provide the 
appropriate analytical framework for the Martinez case). 
 49 Id. at 2991. 
 50 Id. at 2990. 
 51 This is a sleight of hand.  Justice Ginsburg is not referring here to U.C. Hastings’ stipulat-
ed all-comers policy.  California law does not require student groups to accept all-comers.  
 
Oct. 2014] UNIVERSITIES AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW MAKERS 11 
So, the people of California disapprove of discrimination on the 
basis of religion.  To prevent them being implicated in Christian Le-
gal Society’s religious discrimination, of which the people of Califor-
nia disapprove, U.C. Hastings discriminates against Christian Legal 
Society on the basis of . . . its religion.  And this is constitutionally 
permissible, says Justice Ginsburg, because U.C. Hastings must have 
the freedom “to advance state law goals,” such as eradicating religious 
discrimination, by whatever constitutionally-permissible means it can, 
including engaging in religious discrimination.52 
This is an expansive freedom, indeed!  U.C. Hastings is free to 
vindicate its non-discrimination commitments by violating those 
commitments.  Where in the Constitution is this freedom to violate 
one’s own commitments to be found?  Justice Ginsburg grounded 
U.C. Hastings’ freedom not in the Speech or Assembly Clauses of the 
First Amendment, nor in the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of 
powers to the states.  Indeed, she did not ground it in the United 
States Constitution at all (written or living) but rather in the universi-
ty’s “right to preserve the property under its control for the use to 
which it is lawfully dedicated.”53  This right of private property is 
among the oldest in our constitutional order.  U.C. Hastings enjoys 
the rights of private property under common law, not in its capacity 
as a state actor but rather in its capacity as a private property owner.  
It frees the University to restrict access to the intellectual and social 
life of its campus.  Because the University is also a state actor, it must 
ensure that its restrictions are reasonable and content-neutral.  But 
subject to those conditions, the University may exclude from its 
property anyone it pleases, just like any other property owner. 
The right to exclude others from one’s property, which the Court 
has elsewhere called the most essential of all property rights,54 pro-
tects a robust domain of constitutional freedom.  The English jurist 
and scholar William Blackstone called property the owner’s “despotic 
 
Instead, California law prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion and sexual orien-
tation.  That prohibition is incorporated in and subsumed by U.C. Hastings’ written policy, 
the very policy that Justice Ginsburg insisted she would not consider; the very policy that 
discriminates against Christian Legal Society because it is a religious group.  Justice Gins-
burg secured for U.C. Hastings a favorable standard of review by treating the all-comers 
policy as the relevant law and ignoring the written policy, then allowed U.C. Hastings to 
clear the standard of review by treating the written policy as law and ignoring the all-
comers policy. 
 52 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990–91. 
 53 Id. at 2984. 
 54 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419 (1982) (quoting Kai-
ser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (referring to the right to exclude as 
“one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized 
as property”)). 
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dominion.”55  Within this domain property owners, including univer-
sities, are not answerable to those outside.  Blackstone’s description 
was a bit of an exaggeration, but not much.  The point of private 
property is to free property owners, such as universities, and their col-
laborators, such as faculty, staff, and students, to choose and to act for 
their own purposes, to make their own commitments, and to free 
them from having to justify their choices and commitments to others.  
By choosing to act for purposes that others might not value, those 
within the property domain exercise freedom to commit themselves 
to certain obligations and norms, to constitute themselves in particu-
lar ways that they deem valuable. 
So, property rights free a university to promote the intellectual 
and social life of its campus by restricting access to it.  This freedom is 
constrained by reason, by common law doctrines which limit property 
rights, and by public law limitations.  For example, because U.C. Has-
tings is also a state actor, it must ensure that its restrictions are rea-
sonable and content-neutral.  But subject to those conditions, the 
University may exclude from its property anyone it pleases, just like 
any other property owner. 
Even those norms that are imposed on private property owners 
from without are largely determined by institutions of private order-
ing.  When domains of property ownership come into conflict with 
other domains of property ownership, the rights and duties of each 
are settled and determined not only by legislatures but also by institu-
tions other than governments.  Neighbors create rights and duties by 
creating easements, covenants, and servitudes, or by forming condo-
minium associations and other common-interest communities. Own-
ers of common resources, such as lakes and rivers, distribute entitle-
ments to the resources among their members in accordance with 
general common law standards of reasonable use.  And when conflict 
cannot be avoided, a jury, that great common law institution of prac-
tical wisdom, resolves it.  The jury draws its membership from the 
community of private citizens, and resolves disputes between private 
parties who hire their own lawyers and put on their own evidence.  
Private citizens thus settle the question of what should be done. 
Those norms that are formed by and around property ownership 
become structural, institutional, and in a very real sense, constitu-
tional.  The norms become constitutional norms in both a private, in-
ternal sense and in a public, political sense.  Internally, by exercising 
its right to exclude for particular reasons, the property owner consti-
tutes itself as a particular kind of property owner.  U.C. Hastings and 
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other universities that have decided to exclude Christian groups, such 
as Vanderbilt University, have by that decision constituted themselves 
as communities that exclude Christians.56  They have made a com-
mitment to exclude Christians, and they would therefore fail to re-
spect their own integrity if they thereafter accepted Christians.  The 
norms of exclusion that they have adopted to govern their own con-
duct have become part of their institutional identities.  They have 
made themselves into universities from which Christian organizations 
are excluded as a matter of conclusive reasons, a matter of right and 
obligation. 
Externally, the actions of U.C. Hastings and Vanderbilt also have 
constitutional implications for those outside their communities.  
When it exercises its right to exclude, U.C. Hastings imposes legal ob-
ligations on those whom it excludes, just as it creates legal rights for 
those whom it allows on its property.  The duty of self-exclusion 
which correlates with the right to exclude is, if not perfectly absolute, 
categorical.  The particular reasons why U.C. Hasting and Vanderbilt 
have decided to exclude Christian groups are irrelevant to the practi-
cal deliberations of those Christian groups.  It is enough for them to 
know that they are excluded from property that they do not own. 
So, within the confines of the Constitutional text, U.C. Hastings 
has broad discretion to adopt policies which determine the rights and 
obligations of all those who participate in the life of the university and 
to shape the rights and duties of those would like to do so, and those 
who interact with the university—the university’s neighbors, credi-
tors, employers of its graduates, and many others.  The Constitution 
largely frees U.C. Hastings to reason about what is just and right, what 
rights and obligations potential members and collaborators will and 
will not have, even though, or perhaps because, its decisions will have 
profound consequences for those within its community and those 
within the political community of which it is part. 
The categorical nature of the duty of self-exclusion is mitigated by 
property’s promotion of pluralism.  Christian groups are free to ac-
quire their own property and open their own universities.  Not far 
from Vanderbilt sits Union University, a landowner that has consti-
 
 56 See Vanderbilt University Dean of Students, Student Organizations & Governance Equal Op-
portunity Policies, available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/studentorganizations/registering-
your-org/equal-opportunity-policies (“Registered student organizations must be open to 
all students as members and must permit all members in good standing to seek leader-
ship posts.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Vanderbilt’s Right to Despise Christianity, Public Dis-
course (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/03/4930/ (“Last 
week, the [Vanderbilt] administration officially declared  the policy that Venderbilt will 
exclude student religious groups that ‘impose faith-based or belief-based requirements 
for membership or leadership.’”). 
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tuted itself around a distinctly Christian understanding of higher ed-
ucation.  Domains of property ownership promote various and plural 
institutions of value, commitments, and order. 
Private universities, such as Vanderbilt and Union, enjoy even 
broader freedom than state universities to constitute private and civic 
orders and to help shape our political orders.57  Because they are not 
state actors, private universities are largely unconstrained by written 
constitutions.  They are bound only by those reasonableness stand-
ards which preceded our written Constitution, those contained in the 
common law.  Furthermore, private universities such as Vanderbilt 
and Union help to shape the common law itself.  The common law is 
that body of customs and traditions by which our people and institu-
tions have ordered their civic affairs for so long “that the memory of 
man runneth not to the contrary,” as Blackstone expressed it.58  But 
customs and traditions change; they evolve to accommodate new ide-
as.  So, it matters a lot which people, groups, and institutions shape 
our customs and traditions, and which ideas they act upon. 
Who today is shaping the customs and traditions that will order 
the civic lives of future generations?  It seems that universities play a 
leading role in this foundational aspect of constitutional ordering.  
Universities are leaders among those actors who create customs, 
rights and obligations, and among those who shape public views 
 
 57 Apart from the Thirteenth Amendment, the provisions of the United States Constitution 
constrain only state actors, not private property owners.  Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 
551, 567 (1972) (holding that a private shopping center can prohibit distribution of 
handbills, even if such prohibition would violate First Amendment rights in a public 
space) (“It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to 
yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate al-
ternative avenues of communication exist.”).  But some state constitutions have been in-
terpreted to place constitutional limits on private property owners, such as universities 
and shopping centers, which provide public forums.  See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Cen-
ter v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (“It is, of course, well established that a State in the 
exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable restritions on private property so long 
as the restrictions do not amount to a taking without just compensation or contravene 
any other federal constitutional provision.”); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 632 (N.J. 
1980) (“Regulations . . . devoid of reasonable standards designed to protect both the le-
gitimate interests of the University as an institution of higher education and the individu-
al exercise of expressional freedom cannot constitutionally be invoked to prohibit the 
otherwise noninjurious and reasonable exercise of such freedoms.”).  Therefore, as a 
general rule, the policies of private institutions are constrained only by the general ra-
tional basis requirement which undergirds constitutional law in the common law tradi-
tion at least since Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8 Co. Rep. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C. P. 1610).  Sir 
Edward Coke, Chief Justice of England’s Court of Common Pleas, stated that “when an 
Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.” 8 Co. Rep. 
at 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652. 
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about what customs, rights, and obligations ought to be given the 
force of law.  Therefore they are influential creators of private, civic, 
and political order.  We ought to consider how these actors exercise 
their considerable power.  How do universities situate their campuses, 
and how does that affect their neighbors’ property?  What conse-
quences do universities’ actions have for those in their local commu-
nities and their states?  Whom will these universities choose to edu-
cate?  Whom will they hire to teach?  What will they teach?  What will 
they not teach?  These are constitutional questions. 
